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Informal Benchmarks as a Source of Regulatory 





This paper investigates to what extent unregulated local monopolies attempt not to evoke the 
introduction of a formal price regulation by conforming to customers’ and authorities’ 
expectations. It is argued that utilities can meet expectations by setting prices that imitate 
neighbours’ prices. The empirical evaluation rests on a cross-sectional data set representing 
all Swedish district heating utilities, and on a flexible nonlinear IV specification. It is found 
that while utilities’ price setting schemes are insensitive to customer complaints, they are 
significantly influenced by the passive monitoring by authorities. The spillover effect from 
the 5-6 closest neighbours is around 40 %. 
JEL-Code: L11, L33, L97. 
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1. Introduction 
Utilities responsible for network services are typically subject to price regulation based on the belief 
that no price restriction will lead to inefficiently high prices. However, unregulated monopolies can 
choose not to maximise their profits if the threat of introducing price regulation in the near future is 
sufficiently strong (Brunekreeft, 2004; Block and Feinstein, 1986). The justification for such 
behaviour can be that firms have a willingness to transfer scrutiny to other firms (Decker, 1998) and/or 
to prevent more stringent regulatory activity in the future (Lutz et al., 1998). Hence, regulatory threat 
can be viewed as an analogy to the threat of new market entrants, as described by Baumol (1982).  
 
The literature has traditionally assumed that the threat of introducing regulation is a function 
increasing in the monopoly’s own price. While that is correct in theory, assessments of own-price 
variations tend to ignore the insufficient access to firm-level information, which is a prominent feature 
of practical regulatory work, and consequently, the predicted change in regulatory threat for a given 
price adjustment is likely to be overestimated. A potentially more substantive threat exists if there are 
several local monopolies where customers and passive agencies with authority to raise public policy 
concerns can compare prices in neighbouring jurisdictions, thereby reducing their information 
disadvantage. Relatively larger price variations among neighbours, all else equal, can then increase the 
probability of regulatory intervention. If utilities internalise this probability function into their profit 
optimisation, they will set prices that correlate with their neighbours’ prices and consequently, if 
prices are found to be spatially correlated, one may infer that firms are influenced by a threat of 
regulatory intervention. The empirical literature shows that firms increase their efficiency when 
neighbours have been subject to real regulatory intervention. For example, Block and Feinstein (1986) 
show that the cost of highway construction is reduced after antitrust enforcement in neighbouring 
jurisdictions, and Eckert and Eckert (2010) find that firms are more likely to comply with 
environmental regulations when neighbours have recently been found to violate those regulations. 
However, it is uncertain whether an entire sector is sensitive to more subtle threats originating from 
media coverage, requirements to report more detailed statistics, pro-regulatory views of interest groups 
etc. 
 
With the exception of anecdotal evidence,
3 there are few examples of completely unregulated utility 
prices.
4 The Swedish heating sector is an exception as the locally monopolised district heating utilities 
operate entirely without price restrictions. This practice is highly unorthodox given that the sector 
consists of a mixture of public and private utilities, that short-term substitutes are generally not 
available (customers face substantial sunk cost) and that the use of some substitutes in urban multi-
                                                 
3 Before deregulation of the Swedish electricity sector in 1996, the utilities had never been subject to any price 
regulation. Despite this, prices charged to consumers during the pre-deregulatory period (approx. 100 years), 
were relatively low in international comparison (Kaiser, 1994).   
4 Even in cases of public ownership, utilities have typically been subject to the constraint of cost recovery.      3 
dwellings is subject to technical and environmental restrictions (e.g. wood-fired heating technologies 
are generally not allowed in urban areas). However, it is reasonable to assume that the utilities have 
been exposed to regulatory threat, since the introduction of price regulation has been debated for 
several years
5 and investigations have recently been conducted by the Swedish Competition Authority 
(SCA) to assess the utilities’ degree of market power. Both the SCA and the electricity regulator, the 
Energy Markets Inspectorate (EMI), have recommended that the prices be subject to regulation (SCA, 
2009; EMI, 2007), and the customers’ most influential interest group, the Association of Property 
Owners, has argued that third party providers be allowed to access the networks. Although individual 
utilities have been targeted in much of the debate/investigations, it is reasonable to assume that any 
future intervention will follow the Swedish tradition of regulating all utilities according to the same 
principles. Hence, it seems natural that the threat is equally distributed across all utilities.  
 
Based on observed behaviour in other regulated monopoly markets where customers can formally 
dispute utility conditions, it is known that the average customer is inclined to compare his/her price 
level with that of the closest neighbour (Söderberg, 2008).
6 It is uncertain, but quite possible, that 
customers are also sensitive to how geographically distant the closest neighbour is. Yet, they seem to 
be ignorant about other heterogeneous factors that potentially explain price differences. Agencies are 
likely to be more sophisticated in their performance assessments and it can be inferred that they 
consider prices set by a larger number of neighbours since demand and supply conditions are likely to 
be correlated over a wider area (we return to this in Section 4). This resembles the notion of 
benchmark regulation first laid out by Shleifer (1985). Also, agencies might be subject to influences 
from interest groups, and the mainstream prediction, based on ideas suggested by Stigler (1971), is 
that relatively larger firms are inclined to lobby more successfully. Several empirical studies have 
confirmed that resource-rich actors come out better when heterogeneous actors are under scrutiny by 
the bureaucratic machinery (Knittel, 2003; Klein and Sweeney, 1999; Yeager, 1987; Garvie and 
Keeler, 1994). It has also been claimed that the interest group theory has been more successful than 
alternative theories in predicting the behaviour in regulated markets (Francis, 1993). Hence, one can 
expect the probability of agency intervention to fall when a utility changes its price so that it becomes 
more similar to that of a nearby and relatively larger neighbour. More specifically, the hypotheses this 
study attempts to test are whether utilities attempt to avoid regulation by paying attention to 
customers’ and agencies’ passive monitoring of prices:  
 
H1: Utilities are influenced by the price charged by the closest neighbour. This influence 
decreases with distance, but is unaffected by the size of the neighbour.  
                                                 
5 This led to the enactment of the District Heating Law (SFS 2008:263) in 2008, which stipulates, e.g. that prices 
should be made publicly available (Chapter 5) and that district heating utilities must report network-level 
statistics to the EMI (Chapter 40).   
6 Söderberg (2008) reviews all dispute cases between 1980 and 2004, including the arguments put forward by 
customers and utilities, handled by the Swedish electricity regulator.      4 
 
H2: Utilities are influenced by the prices charged by their neighbours (i.e. in addition to the 
prediction in H1). This influence decreases with the distance to the neighbours and when the 
neighbours are relatively smaller.  
 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, rather than relying on one or a 
limited number of case studies, which most of previous empirical evaluations have done, it uses the 
rigour provided by econometric estimations to empirically investigate the role of regulatory threat in 
utility sectors. Second, it relaxes the common assumption made in empirical studies that neighbours 
carry an equal or predetermined weight when the distributed lag model is applied (further described in 
Section 4.1). Third, it demonstrates how a more flexible non-linear model specification can be used in 
spatial studies and that it can reveal valuable information about agents’ behaviour. Fourth, it provides 
policy implications as it adds novel information about whether and how to design a formal regulatory 
regime.  
 
The paper continues with a description of the Swedish district heating sector in Section 2 and a review 
of the literature in Section 3. It then moves on to Section 4, where the model specification is outlined 
together with data exploration and estimations. Section 5 concludes the paper and elaborates on some 
policy implications.   
 
 
2. The Swedish district heating sector 
District heating consists of a production plant where water is heated and a physical network that 
distributes the heated water to buildings. The water is then returned to the plant for reheating. A few of 
the plants also generate electricity, but the fact that their share of the total energy production is very 
small makes strategic pricing issues of little practical interest.   
 
The Nils Holgersson annual reports on local utility services report a real average price increase of 
around 12 % from 1998 to 2007 for district heating.
7 This increase is almost double that for the 
regulated electricity distribution sector during the same period (based on regulatory statistics provided 
by EMI). The number of district heating customers increased from 149 000 in 1998 (SCB, 2001) to 
289 000 in 2007 (SCB, 2009), and the average network expansion increased from 4-5 km of lines 
annually at the end of the 1990s to 7-10 km in 2006-07 (based on statistics collected by the Swedish 
District Heating Association). At present, district heating meets approximately 50 % (or 47 TWh) of 
the total heat demand in Sweden and it is the most common heating alternative for multi-dwelling 
houses in 234 out of the 290 Swedish municipalities (SCA, 2009; SCB, 2009). Hence, a substantial 
                                                 
7 Available at www.nilsholgersson.nu   5 
and increasing proportion of the population relies on the contract conditions determined solely by the 
district heating utilities.  
 
Of relevance to this study is how the causal relationship between a particular price and the prices 
charged by the neighbours operate. In particular, it is important to establish whether the utilities are 
primarily engaged in a simultaneous ‘game’ of price setting or react to observed (i.e. historical) prices. 
A strong case can be made for the simultaneous behaviour since, first, utilities want to avoid erratic or 
unsynchronised zigzag price patterns that can result from using neighbours’ past prices as the guiding 
principle. Second, average prices are influenced by multi-period price guarantees that are publicly 
offered to new customers (with many networks still expanding, these are likely to substantially 
influence future prices). Third, prices charged in a given period are typically posted in advance and for 
publicly owned utilities there are also council announcements and public debates on next year’s prices.   
 
 
3. Previous studies 
From the above, it follows that a central assumption in this study is that prices are spatially correlated 
due to utilities’ conscious and selective behaviour governed by a desire to minimise regulatory 
intervention. An alternative explanation for spatial association is based on the social network theory 
(Hägerstrand, 1953), which claims that spatially correlated behaviours occur as a result of geographic 
proximity with the correlation being decreasing for longer distances (Erlingsson, 2008). The 
unselected human interactions that the network theory rest on is therefore incomplete in making 
predictions about more selective correlations, for example based on actor characteristics. In addition, 
while both the network and benchmark theories predict that only neighbours in relatively close 
geographic proximity impose an influence on a given price, the network theory has a priori very little 
to say on the number of neighbours that are likely to have a significant impact. Spatial correlations of 
supply and demand conditions, on the other hand, can be determined from available statistics to form 
expectations on agencies’ and utilities’ behaviour.    
 
More detailed insights gained from previous research are drawn from two different fields of research: 
1) empirical investigations of simultaneous spatial associations, and 2) theoretical expositions of 
monopolies’ response to the threat of regulatory intervention. Spatially correlated economic indicators, 
including prices, have found widespread support.
8 In a study of hospital prices in the U.S., Mobley 
(2003) finds a statistically significant relationship between neighbouring prices. However, the analysis 
ignores the distance between neighbours and only considers the order of closeness, and the weight 
attached to each hospital does not include any other economic factor. Pinkse et al. (2002) apply more 
elaborate methodology as they allow the closest neighbour, neighbours who share a border and 
                                                 
8 See Gamerman and Moreira (2004) for a recent survey of spatial models.    6 
neighbours who share a second-order border to carry different weights in their study of the US 
gasoline market. They also allow the weights of neighbours to vary as a function of distance. They 
conclude that only the closest neighbour affects the price substantially and that distance has a very 
limited influence. Both these price studies investigate markets where customers can switch between 
providers and it is therefore natural to expect spatially related prices. The hypothesis of local 
monopoly prices being spatially correlated has not yet been tested empirically.  
 
While there is limited empirical work on whether real firm behaviour is influenced by regulatory 
threat, a number of theoretical models have concluded that it can effectively cap prices (e.g. 
Brunekreeft, 2004), and Bawa and Sibley (1980) argue that there may be limited incentives to 
inefficiency when firms are subject to threat. Glazer and McMillan (1992) stress that firm behaviour is 
sensitive not only to the probability of imposing price regulation, but also to how the marginal effects 
of changes in price level affect that probability. This can make the firm absorb (a proportion of) an 
increase in input cost, which justifies flatter relationships between cost components and price than 
what intuition suggests.  
 
Also, Chisari and Kessides (2009) show that a utility is likely to first employ a low-price policy for as 
long as its network is expanding and then increase its prices as its network coverage reaches maturity. 
This is indeed relevant for the Swedish district heating sector where the level of maturity varies 
substantially. Their conclusions are based on the assumptions of profit-maximisation and a price 
ceiling caused by a substitute, which mirrors the conditions in the Swedish district heating sector well. 
Their derivation of the optimal price is therefore used as a basis for the model specification applied in 
the subsequent section. Stated very briefly, utilities’ dynamic objective function is formulated as:  
 
max  [ ] { } ∫
¥
- Y + Y - =
0
) (   ) ( 1 ) , ( ) 0 ( dt t t N P e i
rt p p p    (1) 
 
where π is the unregulated profit, which is reduced to p if regulation is introduced. The probability of 
regulatory intervention is denoted Ψ; N is the number of customers; r is the rate of depreciation and t 
is time. A constraint is that the utilities’ rate of expansion N’ is equal to the difference between the 
substitute price ξ(N) and its own price Pi. Also, the assumption is that the probability of regulatory 
intervention is a function of the monopoly’s own price, h(Pi).
9 After manipulation, Chisari and 
Kessides (2009) formulate the optimal price as: 
 
                                                 
9 Chisari and Kessides (2009) also formulate constraints that define initial and terminating constraints on the size 
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The first term in eq. (2) represents the marginal increase in profit following a price increase. The 
second term denotes the marginal decrease in future profits following the reduction in network size 
caused by a price increase. The last term indicates that the marginal profit is reduced by the increased 
probability of regulatory intervention that occurs as a result of a price increase. This suggests that the 
profit is a function of own price, the lowest substitute price, level of network coverage, and the 




Pair-wise correlations between district heating prices in municipality i and its neighbours j (with j=1 
being the closest neighbour) display an erratic pattern with significant correlations only for j=1, 5 and 
7. Hence, a well-behaved spatial pattern can only appear if heterogeneous conditions are considered. 
Two such conditions are urban population density, which is associated with the price of electricity
10 
(the primary substitute for district heating), and the unit price of labour. Pair-wise correlations for 
these variables reveal more consistent patterns of significant correlations and as expected, the 
correlations are subject to decay. Table 1 shows that the significant correlations have disappeared for j 
larger than approximately 5.  
 
 
Table 1. Pair-wise correlation of supply characteristics. 
Ordered neighbours 
(closest denoted ‘1’) 
Urban population 
density 
Unit price of 
labour 
  Corr. (Sig.)  Corr. (Sig.) 
1  0.168 (0.011)  0.246 (0.000) 
2  0.094 (0.158)  0.119 (0.072) 
3  0.209 (0.002)  0.145 (0.029) 
4  0.320 (0.000)  0.032 (0.637) 
5  0.158 (0.017)  0.102 (0.126) 
6  0.015 (0.823)  0.072 (0.282) 
7  0.044 (0.508)  0.052 (0.438) 
8  0.053 (0.431)  -0.021 (0.757) 
9  -0.004 (0.948)  0.095 (0.152) 
10  -0.025 (0.704)  0.035 (0.601) 
15  -0.071 (0.287)  -0.049 (0.463) 





                                                 
10 Jamasb and Söderberg (forthcoming) show that customer density is negatively related to prices in the Swedish 
electricity distribution sector.    8 
4.1 Specification 
Based on the earlier discussion, eq. (                   2) is modified by replacing the h(Pi) expression with 
the prices charged by the utilities’ neighbours j, conditioned on a representative distance dij between 
utility i and j, and size Sj of the neighbours, h( j ij
n
j S d P , | ). Under the assumption that utilities are 
engaged in a simultaneous price game, and with 
n P 1 and 
n
J P denoting the price of the closest 
neighbour and a representative price of the group of closest neighbours, respectively, one can 
formulate a general price equation for utility i as: 
 
Pi = ρ1W1
n P 1  + ρJWJ
n
J P  + Xiβ + εi       (3) 
 
where W1 and WJ are weight matrixes with wi,1 and wi,J representing the weights carried by the 
individual neighbours; ρ1 and ρJ are the spatial associations between Pi and its two different sets of 
neighbours and Xi is a vector of network heterogeneity. The existing spatial literature typically 
assumes that wij is a function of distance that is determined a priori to avoid the complications 
associated with nonlinear specifications, e.g.  ij ij d w / 1 = . This obviously imposes strong restrictions 
on the influence from distance, but if all covariates are assumed to be exogenous, it has the advantage 
of allowing OLS to be used in estimating (3). More elaborate forms that allow for a parameterisation 
of wij have been proposed (e.g. O’Sullivan and Unwin, 2003; Anselin, 2002), with 
a
ij ij d w / 1 =  being a 
natural extension. However, in this case wij, also needs to control for the neighbours’ size, and two 
ways of specifying size seem plausible. One is to build on the principle that comparisons are locally 
constrained and that neighbours of equal relative size are equally influential. The alternative is to view 
size globally, which implies that the neighbours’ absolute size is used. It is not obvious which one of 
these is preferred, but the relative measure is used initially. The sensitivity of this choice is evaluated 
in sub-section 4.4, where neighbours’ absolute sizes are used as a comparison. Hence, for now wij, is 
written as: 
 
d a ) / ( / 1 i j ij ij S S d w ´ =         (4) 
 
The two parameters in eq. (4), i.e. α and δ, increase the model flexibility and reduce the problems 
associated with misspecification of the weights in small samples (as explained by Florax and Rey, 
1995). Based on the correlations outlined at the beginning of this Section, J is set to 5 in the base case, 
but there is also a need to determine a principle for calculating the
n
J P , diJ and SJ values before eq. (3) 
can be estimated. A risk-neutral utility would incorporate information about all neighbours, and 
average values would therefore be a natural choice. However, it cannot be ruled out that utilities have 
asymmetric risk preferences and attribute more weight to lower or higher price levels among their   9 
neighbours. All three risk principles are evaluated for the estimations presented in Table 2, but only 
the risk neutral principle is reported since the other two generate significantly inferior fits or do not 
even converge.  
 
Finally, the X vector is assumed to consist of district heating market share, price of electricity, a 
dummy for private investor ownership, and exogenous cost characteristics. The market share is 
justified by reference to eq. (2) and the sign is expected to be positive following the prediction by 
Chisari and Kessides (2009) that a profit-maximising utility will keep its price low as long as the 
network is expanding and then raise the price once the expansion reaches maturity in order to 
capitalise on the sunk investment made by customers. However, a negative relationship might occur 
since less financial resources are needed once the large initial investments have been made in 
production and distribution facilities. A potential concern with market share is that it can depend on 
own and substitute prices and maybe even on prices from the recent past since these can contribute to 
expectations about future prices. However, most networks have existed for several decades, which is 
likely to reduce this problem substantially. A further concern about including market share in a price 
equation is that high market shares are associated with lower costs because of the economies of scale 
that typically exist in network sectors. In the base specification it is assumed that there are no scale 
effects since heated water cannot be distributed far without losing effectiveness (this is further 
explored in sub-section 4.4). If regulation can be imposed on individual utilities, there is also a 
potential risk of increased regulatory threat as the market share increases. However, as explained in 
Section 1, that situation is unlikely in Sweden.  
 
Although customers can choose among several heating alternatives when investing in new 
technologies, many of them rely on electricity. The price of electricity is therefore included to 
investigate utilities’ inclination to set prices according to alternatives. Ownership is included to reflect 
that private investors might have stronger incentives to increase prices because of their stronger focus 




Data is collected from EMI, Statistics Sweden and the annual price survey Nils Holgersson. The data 
set is cross-sectional for the year 2007 and represents all municipalities where district heating is a 
significant source of heating in the largest urban area (n=242), excluding Gotland, which is an island. 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix 1.  
 
Further discussion of some of the variables is warranted. First, market share is based on total energy 
(kWh) consumed by residential customers. However, there is little reason to believe that there are 
noticeable cross-sectional variations in the use of electrical appliances or in the consumption of   10 
different heating technologies that could bias this measure. Private ownership is a dummy indicating 
whether private investors own any share of the firm. Private ownership was also evaluated as a share 
variable. Multiple dummies to indicate whether private investors hold minority, majority and full 
control were also evaluated, although all of these measures turned out to be inferior fits.
11 Labour price 
is average municipal salary (net local taxes) in the public sector. This is preferred to figures based on 
accountancy statements since it eliminates the risk of including rents captured by strong unions and 
self-rewards by executives.   
 
 
4.3 Estimation  
The derivation of an estimable spatial lag model is not covered here since it has been thoroughly dealt 
with elsewhere (e.g. Mobley, 2003; Revelli, 2006; Zhou and Kockelman, 2009). The nonlinear 
specification does however require a nonlinear estimation technique, which is more novel in the field. 
Non-linear least square (NLLS) is used as a benchmark estimator and the 2-stage version (NL2SLS) is 
applied to address the endogeneity from having the neighbours’ prices on the RHS.
12 The choice of 
instruments is not trivial in spatial lag models, but neighbours’ prices from previous years are natural 
candidates, and Kelejian and Prucha (1998) argue that a subset of neighbours’ covariates can be used 
to arrive at consistent spatial parameters. The first price lag is avoided to eliminate potential influences 
from neighbours’ most recent observed prices. Hence, neighbours’ prices lagged two years and their 
prices of labour in present year are used as instruments.   
 
 
The output from the NLLS and NL2SLS estimations are displayed in Table 2. Estimations are 
performed for when J consists of the 5 and 6 closest neighbours in order to investigate the sensitivity 
of varying the scope of the set of neighbours. One can conclude that all four models produce similar 
results in terms of significance and sign and that no parameter has an unreasonable sign. The IV-
specifications, which are forcefully accepted by the Sargan-tests, generate a higher point estimate of 
the ρJ-coefficient, which suggests that ignoring the endogeneity tends to underestimate the spatial 
association.  
 
The ρ parameters suggest that the closest neighbour has no unique influence, but the average price 
charged by the 5-6 closest neighbours and their average relative size are both significant across 
models. ρJ is 0.40 and δJ is around 0.06 for the IV-models, suggesting that an increase in PJ by 10 SEK 
                                                 
11 The same exercise was performed in a study of cost levels in the Swedish electricity distribution sector 
(Söderberg, forthcoming), and the same conclusion was drawn.  
12 All estimations reported in Tables 2 and 3 also include 6 dummy variables that control for some companies 
being responsible for the district heating operation in more than one municipality. The parameters for these 
dummies are not reported.  
   11 
will increase Pi by 4 SEK if Si = SJ. If SJ is ten times larger than Si, the neighbours will carry a weight 
that is 1.15 times larger, and Pi goes up by 4.6 SEK when PJ increases by 10 SEK. The relative size 
interval for the full sample indicates that Pi could increase from 3.3 SEK to 4.9 SEK for a 10 SEK 
increase in PJ. Hence, one is led to conclude that utilities’ pricing behaviour is consistent with 
predictions made by the interest group theory.  
 
 
Table 2. Estimation output for eq (3).   
 
  J consists of 5 closest neighbours    J consists of 6 closest neighbours 
  NLLS    NL2SLS    NLLS    NL2SLS 
Variable  Mean    Std.err.    Mean    Std.err.    Mean    Std.err.    Mean    Std.err. 
ρ1  0.0758   0.0740   -0.0566    0.0858    0.0636    0.0672    -0.0524    0.0843 
α1  -0.4809   0.3098   0.1236    0.3013    -0.4691    0.3080    0.0934    0.3294 
δ1  -0.4105   0.3402   0.1548    0.1280    -0.4787    0.3523    0.1658   0.1528 
ρJ  0.2866 ***  0.1053   0.3981 ***  0.1573    0.3096 ***  0.1043    0.4131 ***  0.1505 
αJ  -0.0154   0.0542   -0.0028   0.0740    -0.0180   0.0496    -0.0103   0.0702 
δJ  0.0821 **  0.0392   0.0562 **  0.0284    0.0860 **  0.0370    0.0636 **  0.0278 
Market share  -76.314 ***  26.889   -62.869 ***  27.725    -73.585 ***  26.841    -57.062 ***  27.754 
Electricity price  0.1421 ***  0.0398   0.1501 ***  0.0413    0.1436 ***  0.0395    0.1467 ***  0.0409 
Privately owned  16.648 *  9.6402   17.229 **  9.9019    14.634   9.6561    15.192 *  9.9541 
Fuel price  0.1247 ***  0.0446   0.1457 ***  0.0451    0.1204 ***  0.0445    0.1372 ***  0.0450 
Labour price  0.0109 ***  0.0036   0.0094 ***  0.0045    0.0103 ***  0.0036    0.0091 ***  0.0045 
                               
Sargan stat          7.058                6.027     
Sargan p-value                               
AIC  8.1797        8.1798        8.1677        8.1704     
Log likelihood  -1316.10        -1316.14        -1314.67        -1315.01     
R
2  0.4573        0.4571        0.4637        0.4622     
n  242        242        242        242     
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
A further insight gained from looking at Table 2 is that a utility enjoying full customer coverage (i.e. 
100 % market share) will charge its customers around 9 % less compared to a newly established 
utility. This contradicts the theoretical predication made by Chisari and Kessides (2009) and adds 
further support to the view that utilities are under economic pressure not to expropriate customers’ 
sunk investment. In addition, there is some indication that private investors set prices that are on 
average 2-3 % higher than publicly owned utilities, yet this is insignificant at the 5 % level for J=6.  
 
Also, the district heating price increases by 1.5 SEK if the price of electricity increases by 10 SEK. 
This finding suggests that utilities may set prices that reflect price variations of the main substitute, but 
caution should be applied since the distribution of electricity is also local and can be influenced by the   12 
same unobserved heterogeneous conditions as district heating (e.g. ground characteristics are likely to 
influence the cost of all underground networks).




This sub-section tests the strength of some of the assumptions made to arrive at the estimates in Table 
2. First, while a thorough investigation of the scale properties of district heating has not yet been 
presented in the literature, it is clear that the impact from market share will be ambiguous if economies 
of scale exist. If average cost declines at a diminishing rate and if price is cost-based, one could 
control for the scale economies by including a measure of output in level and squared form. With 
delivered amount of energy (Q) used as output, eq. (3) can be extended to: 
 
Pi = ρ1W1
n P 1  + ρJWJ
n
J P  + Xiβ + γ1Qi + γ2
2
i Q + εi      (5) 
 
Using the NL2SLS with J set to 6, one can see in Table 3 that there is no significant relationship 
between price and level of output. While more detailed cost investigations may reach a different 
conclusion, it is not unrealistic that district heating has limited scale properties since heated water 
cannot be distributed very far with maintained effectiveness, and compared to electricity distribution 
there have been very few mergers among networks, which suggests that large networks have limited 
cost advantages. Hence, there is no apparent sign of scale economies and the conclusion about market 
share presented in the previous sub-section still holds.  
 
An additional assumption made was that utilities are engaged in a simultaneous game of price setting. 
A plausible alternative is that utilities react to neighbours’ real prices set in the previous year. With 




t P 1 , 1 -  + ρJWJ,t-1
n
t J P 1 , -  + Xi,tβ + εi,t.       (6) 
 
This model indicates less association with the 6 closest neighbours (38% reduction of ρJ) and less 
significance of relative size. The factors in the X vector are virtually unchanged and the AIC value is 
somewhat higher. Hence, there is no indication that this model should invalidate the arguments 
presented in Section 2. It is also worth pointing out that the significant correlation, notwithstanding its 
substantial reduction, confirms that the one-year lag of neighbours’ prices is inappropriate as an 
instrument.  
 
                                                 
13 There is no straightforward way of handling this analytically since electricity distribution networks are not 
confined to municipal borders.    13 
Finally, it is investigated whether utilities respond to neighbours’ absolute size rather than relative 
size. The specification is identical to the one in Table 2 with J=6 and is estimated with NL2SLS, but 
with the exception that wij is now assumed to be:  
 
d a ) ( / 1 j ij ij S d w ´ =           (7) 
 
Table 3 shows that the results found for the relative size difference in Table 2 breaks down almost 
completely. Hence, it seems far-fetched that utilities are sensitive to neighbours’ absolute size.  
 
 
Table 3. Test of alternative hypotheses.  
  Eq (5)  Eq (6)  Eq (3), using eq (7) 
Variable  Mean    Std.err.  Mean    Std.err.  Mean    Std.err. 
ρ1  -0.0429    0.0825  0.0740    0.0730  9.0981    139.51 
α1  0.1128    0.3842  -0.5174    0.3194  -1.2968    1.1413 
δ1  0.1805    0.1881  -0.4321    0.3550  -0.2916    1.4051 
ρJ  0.4109  ***  0.1488  0.2471  **  0.1006  0.0518    0.0920 
αJ  -0.0022    0.0692  -0.0196    0.0657  0.0770    0.1317 
δJ  0.0611  **  0.0290  0.0911  *  0.0478  0.1251    0.1140 
Market share  -57.620  **  28.828  -77.924  ***  27.047  -142.28    119.30 
Electricity price  0.1474  ***  0.0411  0.1559  ***  0.0392  0.1531  **  0.0669 
Investor owned  14.437    10.023  18.217  *  9.6217  19.768    12.248 
Fuel price  0.1354  ***  0.0448  0.1219  ***  0.0448  0.1119    0.1487 
Labour price  0.0086  ***  0.0047  0.0114  ***  0.0037  0.0126    0.0091 
Delivered heat  -0.0084    0.0276             
(Delivered heat)
2  0.3357×10
-5    0.3876×10
-5             
                   
Sargan stat  4.434            4.206     
Sargan p-value                   
AIC  8.1743      8.1888      8.6021     
Log likelihood  -1313.48      -1317.20      -1367.24     
R
2  0.4689      0.4524      0.1719     
n  242      242      242     
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
5. Conclusions and discussions 
There is evidence suggesting that utilities are influenced by administrative agencies’ passive 
monitoring but that they are unaffected by customers’ inclination to complain. Consistent with many 
previous empirical studies on direct and indirect involvement of agencies, relatively powerful firms 
are more influential in shaping the collective market outcome than their smaller counterparts. 
Considering that utilities also tend to decrease their prices when there is less need for large 
investments further underlines that utilities are under economic pressure.  
   14 
If utilities perceive that the threat of regulatory intervention is sufficiently strong, and if the largest 
(private) utilities do not implement large price increases, policy makers might well consider the threat 
of price regulation as a viable alternative to the establishment of a costly agency with uncertain ability 
to significantly increase welfare.
14 However, continuous monitoring is required, not least if electricity 
prices and privately supplied heat continue to increase at a pace similar to what they have during the 
last decade.   
 
In order to make longer-term predictions based on these findings, it is necessary to consider the 
magnitude of the threat and how it might vary in a cross-section. For example, the Swedish 
Competition Authority has been investigating the prices in Uppsala and Stockholm since 2005. These 
are two of the largest district heating utilities and in Stockholm the provider is privately owned. It is 
conceivable that these two will experience a reduced threat once the investigations close, and this will 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable  Source  Description and measurement unit  Mean 
(Std.dev.) 
Min  Max 
P  Nils Holgersson price 
survey
b 
Average district heating price (SEK/MWh)  669 
(75.73) 
405  815 
d1  Coordinates collected 
at kartor.eniro.se 
Distance to closest utility (km)  22.62 
(13.93) 
0.39  82.19 
d1-5  Coordinates collected 
at kartor.eniro.se 
Average distance to five closest utilities (km)  37.04 
(21.28) 
4.77  176.6 
d1-6  Coordinates collected 
at kartor.eniro.se 
Average distance to six closest utilities (km)  40.06 
(22.91) 
5.58  188.0 
S1/Si  Statistics Sweden  Urban population in closest municipality 
relative to urban population in i 
2.09 
(3.18) 
0.04  18.66 
S1-5/Si 
 
Statistics Sweden  Urban population in five closest municipalities 
relative to urban population in i 
2.56 
(2.98) 
0.06  30.54 
S1-6/Si 
 
Statistics Sweden  Urban population in six closest municipalities 
relative to urban population in i 
2.60 
(2.77) 
0.07  26.96 
Msh  Statistics Sweden  District heating’s share of total electricity and 
district heating consumption 
0.3163 
(0.1731) 
0.0155  0.9329 
Pel  Nils Holgersson price 
survey
b and EMI 
Average price of electricity (SEK/MWh)  1 542 
(98.15) 
1 294  1 851 
IO  Annual reports and 
web-information  
Dummy var. to indicate investor owned utility  0.3004 
(0.4594) 
0  1 
Cf
a  Statistics Sweden  Average district heating fuel cost (SEK/kWh)  170.01 
(98.31) 
-126.22  711.98 




20 100  24 100 
Q  EMI  Amount of delivered energy (MWh)  201.6 
(545.5) 
8.4279  6 997 
a Note that the unit price of fuel can be negative since some utilities are paid to dispose of residential waste.  
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